The Good, The Bad, and The Peaceful: Successes and Failures in 21st Century Conflict Resolution
The Colombian peace process demonstrates that successful conflict resolution is a marathon, not a sprint, involving multiple stages, setbacks, and a long-term commitment to implementation.
The 21st century has been a testing ground for conflict resolution, revealing a stark contrast between diplomatic triumphs that ended decades of war and catastrophic failures where international efforts collapsed, leading to prolonged suffering and geopolitical upheaval.
Understanding what separates a successful peace process from a disastrous failure is the most critical question in global affairs. In an era marked by complex civil wars, asymmetric conflicts, and great-power competition, the traditional toolkit of diplomacy has been strained to its limits. This analysis delves into the defining peace processes of the last 25 years, moving beyond simplistic narratives to examine the intricate factors that led to the Good Friday Agreement holding for over two decades, while the Syrian peace process descended into a bloody stalemate. By dissecting these cases, we uncover the fundamental ingredients of sustainable peace: inclusive negotiations, credible implementation, and the alignment of regional interests. Conversely, we see how spoilers, international hypocrisy, and the exclusion of key voices doom processes to collapse. The lessons are not academic; they are urgent guides for navigating current crises in Ukraine, Sudan, and beyond, where the stakes for millions hang in the balance of diplomatic choices.
Introduction – Why Studying Success and Failure Matters
In the fog of war, the pursuit of peace can seem like a gamble. Yet, the outcomes are not random. They are the direct result of strategic choices, institutional designs, and political will—or the lack thereof. For policymakers, mediators, and citizens, analyzing past peace processes is not about assigning blame; it is about building a diagnostic toolkit. Why did a power-sharing government work in one place but collapse in another? How does the design of a ceasefire influence its durability? What role do victims and women play in ensuring an agreement is legitimate?
In my experience reviewing negotiation archives and speaking with mediators, a common thread in failed processes is the “diplomatic shortcut.” This is the temptation to secure a quick ceasefire or a minimalist political deal between elites, while sidelining the difficult work of addressing root causes, planning for verification, and building public buy-in. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan, for example, ended the North-South war but left critical issues like the status of Abyei and Darfur unresolved, planting the seeds for South Sudan’s independence and subsequent internal collapse. Success, on the other hand, often looks slow and messy. It involves multi-track diplomacy that works not just with political leaders but with civil society, business, and religious groups to create a web of support that can withstand the inevitable shocks of post-conflict politics.
This comparative analysis matters because we are living through a period of diplomatic stress-testing. The liberal international order that produced many post-Cold War agreements is fraying. New mediators (like Qatar, Turkey, and China) are emerging alongside traditional ones (the UN, US, EU). The very nature of conflict is changing with urban warfare and digital disinformation. By understanding the anatomy of both triumph and tragedy in conflict resolution, we can better equip ourselves to support peace in our turbulent present.
Background / Context: The Evolving Landscape of Peacemaking

The end of the Cold War in 1991 created a wave of optimism and a surge in peace processes. With superpower proxy wars subsiding, the UN and regional organizations launched ambitious missions to end civil conflicts from El Salvador to Mozambique. The 1990s saw the rise of the “liberal peacebuilding” model, which often coupled peace agreements with prescriptions for democratization, market economics, and security sector reform.
This model had early successes but also profound failures, most horrifically in Rwanda, where the 1993 Arusha Accords collapsed in the 1994 genocide, and in Bosnia, where diplomacy failed to prevent the Srebrenica massacre until NATO military intervention forced the 1995 Dayton Agreement. These tragedies led to serious introspection. The UN’s “Brahimi Report” (2000) emphasized the need for peacekeeping missions with robust mandates and highlighted the critical importance of political strategy over technical assistance.
The 21st century’s defining features have further shaped peacemaking:
- The “War on Terror” (Post-9/11): Made negotiating with groups labeled as terrorists politically toxic, closing off dialogue channels and framing conflicts in binary terms of counter-terrorism, often at the expense of political solutions (e.g., early years in Afghanistan).
- The Rise of Intrastate & Regionalized Conflicts: Wars like those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Syria involve numerous armed groups, regional sponsors, and transnational issues like illicit resource trade, making neat bilateral negotiations impossible.
- The Norm of Inclusion: Groundbreaking UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, along with advocacy from human rights groups, has made the inclusion of women, youth, and civil society in peace talks a demanded—though not always implemented—standard.
- The Return of Geopolitical Rivalry: The 2010s and 2020s have seen peace processes become arenas for competition between major powers (US vs. Russia in Syria, various powers in Libya), complicating mediation and often paralyzing the UN Security Council.
Key Concepts Defined
- Peace Process: The entire spectrum of activities aimed at achieving a peace agreement and implementing it, from pre-negotiation contacts and ceasefire talks to final status negotiations and long-term peacebuilding.
- Spoilers: Individuals or groups who use violence or political tactics to undermine a peace process because they benefit from continued conflict or reject the proposed settlement. They can be inside (signatories who cheat) or outside (hardliners, neighboring states) the process.
- Inclusivity vs. Efficiency Dilemma: The central tension in mediation. Broad inclusivity (bringing in many stakeholders) builds legitimacy and addresses root causes but can make negotiations unwieldy. Narrow efficiency (elite-only talks) can produce a quick deal but one that may be unstable because it lacks broad support.
- Implementation Gap: The chasm between what is promised in a peace agreement and what is delivered on the ground. This gap is where most processes fail, due to lack of funding, loss of political will, or the re-emergence of security dilemmas.
- Transitional Justice: The range of judicial and non-judicial processes used to address legacies of human rights abuses after conflict. This includes tribunals, truth commissions, reparations, and institutional reform. Its integration (or neglect) is a major factor in long-term success.
- Peace Agreement “Stickiness”: A term from research by Barbara F. Walter and others describing why some civil war peace agreements last while others quickly break down. Key factors include: the deployment of peacekeepers, demobilization timelines, and clear terms for power-sharing.
Case Study Analysis: The Successes

1. The Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland, 1998)
Why it succeeded: This agreement ended 30 years of “The Troubles.” Its genius was in its innovative, complex institutional design that did not force a winner-take-all solution on sovereignty.
- Inclusive Negotiations: While led by the UK and Irish governments and major parties (Sinn Féin, UUP, etc.), it was preceded by years of Track II diplomacy and public consultations. The US, as an external mediator, provided crucial leverage.
- Ingenious Power-Sharing: It established the Northern Ireland Assembly with a mandatory coalition government, requiring unionist and nationalist parties to govern together. It created cross-border institutions with Ireland, satisfying nationalist aspirations without ending union with Britain.
- Pillar of Transitional Justice: It led to the early release of prisoners—a hugely controversial but vital confidence-building measure—and established police reform and human rights commissions.
- Patient Implementation: The process was rocky, with suspensions and crises, but the underlying architecture proved resilient. The UK and EU provided massive economic support. It demonstrated that a durable agreement can be “good enough” to manage, rather than perfectly resolve, deep identity conflicts.
2. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Colombia, 2016)
Why it succeeded: It ended a 52-year war with the FARC guerrillas, Latin America’s longest conflict.
- Clear, Integrated Agenda: Negotiations in Havana had a precise, six-point agenda (land reform, political participation, end of conflict, drug trafficking, victims, implementation). This kept talks focused.
- Centrality of Victims: Unprecedented in scale, the agreement placed victims’ rights and transitional justice at its heart. Over 60 victims traveled to Havana to testify. The resulting Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is a hybrid model focused on truth and reparations, not just punishment.
- Detailed Implementation Plan: The 310-page agreement included meticulous timelines, verification mechanisms (a UN mission), and steps for FARC demobilization and reintegration into politics and civilian life.
- Public Endorsement (Despite Initial Rejection): While initially narrowly rejected in a plebiscite, the process of revising the text and securing congressional approval ultimately strengthened its legitimacy by forcing a broader public debate and buy-in.
3. The Dayton Peace Agreement (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995)
A Qualified Success. It ended a brutal war but created a dysfunctional state.
- Success in Stopping Violence: It succeeded unequivocally in its primary goal: ending the killing. NATO enforcement was key.
- Innovative & Flawed Design: It created a single sovereign state (Bosnia) with two highly autonomous entities (the Republika Srpska and the Federation). This stopped the war but constitutionalized ethnic division, creating a gridlocked political system that requires international oversight to function.
- Lesson: A peace agreement can be militarily effective but politically unstable if its institutions do not foster integration and multi-ethnic cooperation. Dayton is a success in terms of conflict termination but a cautionary tale for state-building.
Case Study Analysis: The Failures

1. The Syrian Peace Process (2012-Onward)
Why it failed: A textbook case of international discord and bad-faith negotiation.
- Irreconcilable International Positions: The US and allies demanded Assad’s departure as a precondition. Russia and Iran were committed to keeping him in power. With Security Council permanent members backing opposite sides, the UN (through envoys Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, Staffan de Mistura) had no leverage.
- Exclusion of Key Actors: For years, the process focused on a political opposition that had little control over armed groups on the ground. Meanwhile, the Kurdish-led SDC, a major anti-ISIS and governing force, was excluded due to Turkish objections.
- “Process for Process’s Sake”: Talks in Geneva and Astana became a diplomatic ritual, providing cover for military escalation on the ground. They failed to address core issues like security sector reform or transitional justice.
- The Spoiler with an Air Force: The Assad regime, backed by Russia, used negotiations as a tactic to regroup before pursuing military victory, showing that a party with a military solution in sight has little incentive for a genuine political compromise.
2. The South Sudan Peace Process (2015 & 2018 Agreements)
Why it failed (repeatedly): A stark lesson in elite pact-making without public accountability.
- The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict (ARCSS): Signed under intense international pressure, it was a power-sharing deal between President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar. It collapsed in months because it:
- Did not reform the security sector or integrate armies.
- Left wealth and resource control in the hands of the elites.
- Had no real consequences for violations.
- The 2018 Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS): Repeated similar elite power-sharing, and while it has reduced large-scale combat, it has failed to bring peace to civilians. Intercommunal violence festers, and the government remains predatory. The “resource curse” and a lack of genuine commitment to nation-building beyond dividing oil revenues have doomed implementation.
- Lesson: Agreements that focus solely on dividing the “spoils of the state” between warlords, without transforming governance or including broader society, are inherently unstable.
3. The Afghanistan Peace Process (2020 Doha Agreement)
Why it failed: A fatally flawed bilateral deal that excluded the Afghan government and ignored realities on the ground.
- Exclusion of the Afghan State: The US-Taliban deal was negotiated bilaterally, sidelining the US-backed Afghan government. This shattered the legitimacy of the Ghani administration and demoralized the Afghan security forces.
- Ambiguous Terms & Bad Faith: The agreement promised a “reduction in violence” and intra-Afghan talks, but the Taliban never stopped targeting Afghan forces. The US commitment to a full withdrawal removed all leverage to ensure Taliban compliance.
- No Safeguards for Human Rights: The deal made no mention of human rights, women’s rights, or democracy, effectively trading a US exit for a return of the Taliban to power with no guarantees for the population. The collapse of the Afghan state in August 2021 was the direct, predictable outcome.
- Lesson: A peace agreement between an external power and an insurgent group, which ignores the host government and civil society, is not a peace agreement—it is a withdrawal pact that passes the war to locals, often with catastrophic results.
Comparative Insights: What Separates Success from Failure?

By placing these cases side-by-side, critical patterns emerge.
| Factor | In Successful Processes (e.g., Colombia, N. Ireland) | In Failed Processes (e.g., Syria, S. Sudan) |
|---|---|---|
| International Role | Unified external support acting as guarantor & facilitator. | Divided international community acting as partisan sponsors, paralyzing mediation. |
| Inclusivity | Multi-track approach: Victims, women, civil society shape the agenda. | Narrow, elite-only bargaining over power and resources. |
| Agreement Design | Detailed, innovative institutions (power-sharing, TJ) with clear timelines. | Vague, minimalist deals focused on ceasefire and cabinet posts, deferring hard issues. |
| Implementation | Robust verification mechanisms (peacekeepers, monitors) and sustained funding. | “Signature and forget” – no credible enforcement for violations, leading to rapid collapse. |
| Addressing Root Causes | Integrates land reform, justice, economic inclusion. | Ignores or postpones underlying grievances (ethnicity, inequality, governance). |
A deeper, often underappreciated factor is sequencing. Successful processes often follow a logical, albeit slow, sequence: ceasefire -> political framework -> security sector reform -> implementation. Failed processes often try to reverse or skip steps (e.g., trying to hold elections before disarming militias, as in Angola in 1992, which led to renewed war).
Why These Lessons are Critically Important Now
We are at a historical inflection point. The war in Ukraine is the largest in Europe since 1945. Sudan’s collapse threatens regional stability. Myanmar’s civil war grinds on. The lessons from past successes and failures provide a non-ideological playbook—and a warning.
- For Ukraine: Any future peace process must avoid the mistakes of Syria (international division) and Afghanistan (exclusion of the legitimate state). It will require a coherent, unified Western posture supporting Kyiv, and a negotiation structure that addresses security guarantees, justice for war crimes, and reconstruction—not just territory. The Minsk Agreements (2014-15) failed because they were ambiguous and lacked buy-in from Kyiv; future talks cannot repeat this.
- For Fragile States: The lesson from South Sudan is clear: patronage-based peace is not peace. Supporting governance reform, anti-corruption, and inclusive economic development is as vital as signing a ceasefire. The international community must move beyond congratulating elites for signing documents to holding them accountable for implementing reforms.
- For Mediators: The era of pure “liberal peacebuilding” is over, but the alternatives cannot be cynical realpolitik that abandons human rights. The challenge is to craft pragmatic, context-specific solutions that are politically feasible but also morally defensible. This requires mediators with deep local knowledge and the patience to build trust across multiple levels of society.
The Future of Conflict Resolution: Emerging Trends and Adaptations

The field is adapting to a more contested, complex world.
- “Inclusive Enough” and Multi-Stakeholder Processes: Recognizing the inclusivity-efficiency dilemma, new models seek to be “inclusive enough.” This might mean a core political negotiation flanked by separate civil society forums whose outputs are formally fed into the main talks, as was done in Colombia.
- The Rise of Regional Mediators: With UN Security Council paralysis, regional powers and middle powers are taking lead roles. Qatar in mediating between the US and the Taliban, Kenya leading talks on the DRC conflict, and Norway‘s persistent role in various processes show a more multipolar mediation landscape.
- Digital Tools and Peace Tech: As covered in a previous article, technology is being used for digital ceasefire monitoring, tracking implementation of agreement provisions, and crowdsourcing public input on peace priorities. However, it also brings risks of digital espionage and misinformation.
- Focus on Environmental Peacebuilding: Future agreements will increasingly need to address climate-related conflict drivers. This means not just dividing oil revenue, but co-managing shrinking water resources, as seen in dialogues facilitated by EcoPeace Middle East.
- Dealing with “Non-Negotiable” Issues: How to negotiate with groups like ISIS or regimes like Assad’s that are accused of atrocity crimes? The emerging, difficult answer may lie in pragmatic, step-by-step arrangements (humanitarian access, local ceasefires) that reduce suffering without granting full political legitimacy, while maintaining legal accountability pathways.
Common Misconceptions
- Misconception: A signed peace agreement equals peace.
Reality: Signing is the easiest part. The implementation phase is where wars restart. Most failures occur not because the text was bad, but because there was no political will or mechanism to enforce it. - Misconception: All inclusive processes are good, all exclusive ones are bad.
Reality: It’s a balance. Including too many parties with veto power can create paralysis. The key is strategic inclusion: ensuring all groups with the power to spoil the peace have a stake, while creating channels for broader societal concerns to be heard. - Misconception: Military victory leads to a more stable peace than negotiation.
Reality: Research by scholars like Monica Duffy Toft shows that military victories often lead to more durable peace than negotiated settlements only if they are decisive. However, most modern conflicts end in stalemate, making negotiation necessary. Furthermore, victories often come with horrific human costs and can plant seeds for future rebellion if the victor is oppressive. - Misconception: Mediators are neutral facilitators.
Reality: While they must be impartial in the process, mediators always have interests and leverage. The US in Northern Ireland, Cuba, and Norway in Colombia—they were not neutral but were “honest brokers” who used their influence to push parties toward compromise. Pretending otherwise is naive. - Misconception: There are “universal” models for peace.
Reality: Copy-pasting power-sharing from Bosnia to Iraq or Lebanon has had mixed results. Successful agreements are highly contextual, building on local traditions of conflict resolution and addressing the specific grievances of that war.
Conclusion and Key Takeaways

The history of 21st-century peacemaking is a humbling one. It teaches us that ending wars is one of humanity’s most difficult endeavors, requiring a rare alchemy of leadership, timing, design, and sustained international attention. There are no silver bullets, but there are clear indicators of likely success or failure.
Key Takeaways:
- Process is as Important as Product: How a peace agreement is negotiated—who is included, how trust is built, how grievances are aired—is often what determines whether it will hold. Legitimacy is built during the talks, not bestowed by the signature.
- Implementation is the Real Battlefield: The most common cause of failure is not the negotiation, but the lack of a credible, well-resourced plan to implement what was agreed. Peacekeepers, monitors, and guarantors are not optional extras; they are essential infrastructure.
- Address the War, Not Just the Battle: Successful agreements like Colombia’s tackle the root causes (land, political exclusion, injustice) that fueled the conflict in the first place. Failed ones like South Sudan’s merely pause the fighting to allow elites to divide the spoils.
- International Coherence is a Force Multiplier: When the global community is united behind a process and a mediator (as in Northern Ireland), it provides crucial leverage. When it is divided (as in Syria), it becomes part of the problem.
- There are No “Post-Conflict” Societies, Only “Post-Agreement” Ones: Violence often transforms but does not disappear. The work of peacebuilding—reconciliation, justice, economic revival—is a generational task that begins the day an agreement is signed and requires patience and commitment long after the headlines fade.
As we confront new and persistent conflicts, these lessons from recent history are our most valuable guide. They urge us to be ambitious in our pursuit of peace, but rigorous in our analysis, humble in our methods, and unwavering in our focus on the dignity and security of the people who have endured the horrors of war. For more on the structures and partnerships that enable long-term stability, explore our resources on strategic business alliances and global nonprofit initiatives.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q1: What is the single most important factor for a successful peace agreement?
While no single factor guarantees success, the strongest correlating factor is the deployment of a robust, impartial peacekeeping or monitoring mission to oversee implementation, particularly the demobilization of combatants. This reduces security fears and builds confidence that the deal will be enforced.
Q2: Why do peace agreements often fail to include women, despite evidence that they improve success?
Deep-seated patriarchal norms within conflict parties and even within mediating institutions are a primary barrier. There’s also a misguided perception that women’s issues are “secondary” to security and power-sharing, and that including women complicates talks. It requires persistent pressure from civil society and mandates from bodies like the UN Security Council to overcome this.
Q3: Can a peace process succeed if one or both parties are acting in bad faith?
It is extremely difficult but not impossible. The role of the mediator and international guarantors becomes critical to “test” and enforce compliance through conditionality (linking aid or sanctions relief to steps). The process may need to start with small, verifiable confidence-building measures to establish a pattern of reliability before tackling bigger issues.
Q4: How does transitional justice (like truth commissions) contribute to lasting peace?
It addresses the psychosocial wounds of conflict that, if left untreated, fuel cycles of revenge. By acknowledging victims, establishing facts, and (in some models) holding perpetrators accountable, it can help rebuild social trust and the rule of law. However, it must be carefully designed to be perceived as fair by all sides to avoid being seen as “victor’s justice.”
Q5: What is “spoiler management” and how is it done?
It involves strategies to neutralize those who would undermine a peace deal. Tactics include: Inclusion (bringing them into the process to give them a stake), Marginalization (undermining their legitimacy or resources), Inducement (offering them benefits), or Coercion (applying sanctions or force). The right tactic depends on whether the spoiler has legitimate grievances or is purely opportunistic.
Q6: Are there conflicts that are simply “unresolvable” through negotiation?
Very few. Most conflicts have a “ripe” moment for resolution, often when a “hurting stalemate” is reached—when parties realize they cannot win militarily and the cost of fighting is unbearable. The mediator’s art is in identifying and exploiting that moment. Some conflicts driven by existential identity threats or genocidal intent are harder, but even then, negotiation may be possible to manage rather than fully resolve them.
Q7: How do you measure the “success” of a peace agreement?
Success is multi-dimensional and changes over time. Short-term: Cessation of large-scale violence. Medium-term: Successful demobilization and integration of combatants, establishment of new institutions. Long-term: Consolidation of democracy, economic growth, low levels of societal violence, and public perception of the agreement as legitimate. An agreement can be successful in one dimension (stopping war) but a failure in another (creating a functional state).
Q8: What role do economic incentives play in peace processes?
They are often crucial. Peace dividends—quick-impact projects, jobs programs, infrastructure investment—can build public support for an agreement. For elites, the promise of access to legitimate commerce and international aid can be a powerful motivator to leave behind war economies. However, if economic incentives are the only glue (as in South Sudan), the peace is shallow.
Q9: Why do some groups refuse to negotiate and prefer to fight to the end?
Ideology (e.g., totalist religious or political beliefs), the lucrative nature of the war economy (control of mines, smuggling routes), the belief in an imminent military victory, or the fear that negotiation will lead to their personal prosecution for war crimes can all make groups prefer continued conflict.
Q10: How has the “War on Terror” affected peace processes?
It has been largely damaging. Labeling groups as “terrorist” creates legal and political barriers to engagement, closing off dialogue channels. It frames conflicts in binary, moral terms (“with us or against us”) that are incompatible with the compromise inherent in negotiation. It has also led to securitized approaches that prioritize military solutions over political ones.
Q11: What is a “hurting stalemate” and why is it important?
A concept from mediator William Zartman, it describes a point in a conflict where neither side can win, but both sides are suffering unacceptable costs from continuing to fight. This mutually painful deadlock is when parties are most likely to seriously consider negotiation. Mediators often try to help parties recognize when they are in one.
Q12: Can digital technology help make peace processes more successful?
Potentially, yes. It can improve transparency and communication (e.g., broadcasting talks), use data analytics to map conflict drivers, and crowdsource public input on priorities. However, it also raises risks of hacking, surveillance, and the spread of misinformation aimed at derailing talks. Tech is a tool, not a solution.
Q13: What happens when a peace agreement is rejected by the public in a vote (like Colombia initially)?
It’s a serious crisis but not necessarily fatal. It forces negotiators back to the drawing board to address public concerns. In Colombia, it led to revisions (strengthening references to victim reparations and FARC asset handover) and a new strategy for approval through Congress. This can ultimately produce a more legitimate, robust agreement, but it requires flexible leadership.
Q14: How long does a typical peace process take?
There is no typical. Pre-negotiation contacts can take years. Formal talks can last from a few months (Dayton, which was 21 days of intense negotiation) to several years (Colombia was 4 years, the Philippines-GRP/NDF talks have been on and off for decades). Implementation is measured in decades.
Q15: Are UN-led processes more successful than those led by regional organizations or single states?
There is no clear correlation. Success depends on the credibility and leverage of the mediator, not just the institution. The UN can provide legitimacy and a broad toolkit, but it can be paralyzed by Security Council politics. A regional organization may have more influence and understanding but might be perceived as biased. The best approach is often a coordinated partnership between different mediators.
Q16: What is “local ownership” and why is it emphasized?
It means that the parties and population of the conflict country must drive and own the process and its outcomes. Imposed solutions from outside, no matter how well-designed, are likely to fail because they lack local legitimacy and commitment. The role of outsiders should be to facilitate and support, not dictate.
Q17: How do you negotiate with a party that has committed war crimes or genocide?
This is an acute ethical and legal dilemma. One approach is to pursue “justice during peace”—negotiating a deal that includes robust transitional justice mechanisms (like Colombia’s JEP) to address crimes as part of the settlement. Another is to pursue a pragmatic cessation of violence for humanitarian reasons while maintaining the possibility of international criminal prosecution through separate channels. There is no easy answer.
Q18: Why do some peace agreements lead to a flourishing of democracy and others to authoritarianism?
It depends on the balance of power at the time of settlement and the agreement’s design. If the agreement simply integrates rebel leaders into an existing authoritarian system (as in some African cases), it can reinforce autocracy. If it includes genuine political reform, power-sharing with accountability, and civil liberties (as in Northern Ireland), it can pave the way for democracy.
Q19: Can business leaders play a positive role in peace processes?
Yes, through “Track 1.5” or private diplomacy. Business leaders often have networks across conflict lines, an interest in stability, and the resources to support dialogue initiatives. They can also apply economic pressure on parties to negotiate. However, they can also be spoilers if their businesses profit from conflict.
Q20: What is the biggest mistake mediators make?
Over-optimism and haste. The desire for a quick win can lead mediators to paper over fundamental disagreements with ambiguous language, set unrealistic timelines, or exclude difficult stakeholders. This produces fragile agreements that collapse under the weight of issues they postponed or fudged.
About the Author
This article was authored by a comparative political scientist and senior advisor with over 15 years of experience analyzing and supporting peace processes worldwide. The author has worked with the United Nations, regional organizations, and non-governmental groups, providing strategic analysis on negotiation dynamics, institutional design, and implementation challenges. Their research focuses on the conditions under which peace agreements succeed or fail, with particular expertise in power-sharing, transitional justice, and the role of international actors. They are a firm believer in evidence-based policy to improve the practice of conflict resolution. For more in-depth analysis on global affairs, visit our primary platform at World Class Blogs.
Free Resources
- The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) at the University of Notre Dame: The premier database for comparing peace agreement provisions and implementation across all comprehensive agreements since 1989. An indispensable research tool.
- UN Peacemaker Database: The UN’s own repository of peace agreements, mediation guidance, and lessons learned documents.
- The Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (IPTI): Produces groundbreaking research on the role of inclusion in peace processes, with a focus on women, youth, and civil society.
- The “Comparing Peace Processes” Podcast from Conciliation Resources: Features deep-dive conversations with practitioners and analysts on specific cases.
- The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s “Diplomacy & Conflict” Section: High-quality analysis on ongoing peace processes and geopolitical constraints.
- The International Crisis Group (ICG) “CrisisWatch” and Reports: Monthly conflict tracker and in-depth reports that provide up-to-date context on active peace processes and conflicts.
- The Folke Bernadotte Academy’s Publications: The Swedish agency’s excellent resources on mediation, ceasefire monitoring, and peace agreement implementation.
- The “Beyond Intractability” Knowledge Base: A massive free resource from the University of Colorado covering every concept related to conflict and peace.
Discussion
The study of peace and war forces us to confront difficult trade-offs. Is it ever justified to negotiate with war criminals to stop ongoing violence? Should the international community prioritize stability (a ceasefire) or justice (prosecutions) in the immediate aftermath of atrocity? How do we balance respect for national sovereignty with the responsibility to protect civilians when a state is the primary perpetrator of violence? We invite you to share your views on these ethical dilemmas. Which of the cases discussed do you find most instructive for today’s conflicts? For further exploration of collaborative models that underpin successful implementation, consider this guide on building strategic business partnerships. To contribute to our ongoing analysis or learn more about our work, visit our blog directory or get in touch.
